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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l.\lTED P.\1\,l\_ CITY ~IIXES CO~I-~ 
P.\\Y, a eorporation, 
Plai.utiff, 
v~ I 'rtn: IXDl'STRL\L C<L\ll\llSSlOK 
OF l''L\ 11 & JOH~ \r. PRE8COTT, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFEND,AN·T 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10061 
Defendant, hereinafter referred to as Prescott, dis-
agn'PS with plaintiff's state1nent that "the injury of real 
eont'Pquence" \Vas a trau1natic amputation of his left leg 
etc. The ~ledical AdYisory Board did not attempt to 
~t:gTt•gntP the effects of, or allocate relative importance 
to, hi:3 many injuries to the chest, shoulder, abdomen and 
limh:3, but rather considered their cumulative effect. 
Prescott agrees that the Board found that he sustained 
a 90% loss of body function as a result of multiple in-
juries, but disagrees with the further "statement of 
faet" by plaintiff. which is a sweeping conclusion that 
~ueh language was used solely in the sens(·, "as that term 
i~ employed in the next to the concluding paragraphs of 
~t'l'. 35-1-66 r.C.~\. 1953, the section relating to pern1a-
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nent partial disability. Now here in tlH' n'<'onl is then' 
any such statement or inference. 
Prescott disagrees with the staternent that "because 
of his age, mentality and lirnited ambulation he cannot 
compete for employment". He cannot compete for em-
ployment because of a 90o/o loss of body function as a 
result of multiple injuries. 
Prescott further believes the facts to be incompletely 
stated and in view of the nature of this appeal restates 
the facts on which the Commission based its decision. 
Respondent John W. Prescott, born April 15, 1897, 
(R-58) had been employed by United Park City Mines 
Company and its predecessors in interest for thirty-three 
years, (R-59). During the last thirty-one years of this 
time he had been a motorman on the underground rail-
way hauling ore and waste to the surface, (R-60). On 
July 31, 1961, while uncoupling cars, the train started and 
he was run over by the locomotive, suffering crippling 
injuries hereinafter detailed. 
The nature of and concise sununary of Prescott's 
injuries are set forth in the letter of Harold B. Lamb, 
M.D., his attending physician, from which we quote in 
part, (R-8, 9). 
"A brief list of his injuries include: 
1. Comminuted fracture of the right scapula in-
volving the glenoid fossa. 
2. Dislocation of the right sterno-clavicular joint. 
3. Cornrninuted fractures of 3 thru 7 ribs on right 
side. 
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-l. La<·Pration of right lung with extensive henw-
thorax and pneumothorax. 
;). 'framnatic pneu1nonitis right lung, severe. 
(i. ~pn•n• contmninated avulsion injury of left 
groin with destruction of most of the lympha-
tic, subcutaneous tissue, and adductor muscles 
of the proximal thigh with preservation but 
denudation of the femoral vessels. In addition 
the scrotum and perineum was lacerated so 
that there was exposure of testicular tissue 
and denudation of the membraneous urethra 
with diaruption of periosteal tissues of the 
pubis and ischium. There were full thickness 
abrasions involving the medial hemicircumfer-
encP of the thigh fr01n the groin to the knee. 
1. Trau1natic contaminated amputation of leg 
through knee joint. 
The report of Boyd G. Holbrook, 1LD., consulting 
Orthopedic surgeon, (R-5,6) should be fully considered 
in eonh•xt with its concluding paragraph, which we quote: 
"Some permanent disability of the right 
shoulder girdle is expected as a result of these 
injuries, but is anticipated that they will heal in 
a satisfactory manner with a satisfactory end 
result." 
The finding of the ~Iedical Advisory Board con-
sisting of Korn1an B. Beck, M.D., Chainnan, Burke M. 
~nm,·, ~I.D. and Boyd G. Holbrook :M.D., should be con-
~idered in its pertinent entrirety, which we set forth as 
follows, (R-15) : 
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"The Board recomrnends 90% loss of body 
function as a result of multiple injuries. The groin 
scar should be revised." 
The report of the attending physician, (R-20) Harold 
B. Lamb, in response to the suggestion of the Med-
ical Advisory Board relative to scar revision, is also 
significant as to the nature of the inguinal injuries, 
"'There is no doubt but what some improve-
ment of the scarred area over the inguinal region 
could be achieved. Since there was originally a 
large area of soft tissue loss which healed by 
granulation and scarring, there is some tension of 
the tissues in this area and an adequate revision 
of the scar would probably require some rotation 
of tissues into the defect. In addition, it should 
be noted that the femoral vessels are covered in 
this area only by the scar tissue just previously 
described. There is no intervening muscle or 
fascial structure to protect these vessels. Re sec-
tion of this area might involve some risk to the 
competency of these vessels. Since this procedure 
would be relatively major, it would require some 
type of block or general anaesthesia. J\ir. Prescott 
has marginal cardio-vascular compensation, as 
well as poor puln1onary exchange. It is my opin-
ion at this time that he does not have sufficient 
trouble relative to the scar to warrant the risk 
required in its revision. If he should have in-
creasing difficulties such that it would not be 
practical for him to continue to wear his pros-
thesis, such recommendation would be changed." 
The report of consulting physician, (R-101) Roy 
E. ~r cDonald, M.D., relative to the lung and heart con-
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dition of Prt>~('ott while he was hospitalized is indicative 
of the gTo~~nP~~ of tlw nnlltiplt> injuriP~ and shock suf-
t't·rl'd hy J>n·~·wott and their general debilitating effect 
upon him. 
( )n February ~>, 1963 Prescott was referred to Roy 
K Darkt•, :\I.D. for p~:n·hiatric evaluation prior to the 
rPI'PrPIH'P of hi~ case to the Division of Vocational Re-
habiljtation of the State Board of Education, (R-23). 
The report of Paul T. Furlong of the Division of 
rocational Rehabilitation (R-29, 30) and his testimony 
at the hearing ( R-72, 83) result in an opinion that 
PrP~eott is not a feasible candidate for vocational re-
habilitation and that he be considered totally and per-
manently disabled for employment. 
Factually Prescott was fitted for, and at all times 
herein, uses an artificial limb. He does have limited 
ambulation. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN·T I 
THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FUNCTION IN 
THIS CASE IS THE LOSS ~TTENDANT UPON LEG AM-
PUTATION, AND THE RULE THAT PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY MAY BE PRESUMED FROM INABILITY TO 
RESUME PRE-INJURY TYPE OF WORK DOES NOT APPLY 
WHERE THE LOSS SUSTAINED IS ONE OF THOSE IN 
THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC AWARDS. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Prescott disagrees with the factual basis upon which 
the plaintiff frames the foregoing argument. We would 
concede that if Prescott had suffered only the loss of 
"one leg, at or near the hip joint, as to preclure the 
use of an artificial limb," his disability would be rated 
at 180 weeks pursuant to the provision of 35-1-66 U.C.A. 
1953. These facts are not so. His leg was traumatically 
amputated at the knee and was surgically revised by 
amputation just above the knee and he has been fitted 
with an artificial limb which he uses. To ignore the de-
tailed medical evidence in this case and to substitute a 
theory based upon deductive reasoning is novel indeed. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that there is not a scintilla 
of evidence to support plaintiff's theory. 
The rating of the Medical Advisory Board (R-15) 
is that "'The Board recommends 90% loss of body func-
tion as a result of multiple injuries." The groin scar 
should be revised. 
Plaintiff had an opportunity to elicit testimony in 
support of its theory, but did not so do. Dr. Beck, Medical 
Advisory Board Chairman, was called as a witness and 
was asked to state the physical injuries on which the 
rating of 90% was based; he replied (R-55) "Well, it 
was on the basis of his amputation and other injuries 
involving the ribs, the chest and lungs." When asked 
to elaborate Dr. Beck indicated further that it was based 
on Prescott's history and the medical records. Plaintiff 
thought the rnedical records to be the best evidence of 
what those injuries were, (R-56). 
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.\g·uin at ( H-Sii) Dr. Beck, in response to question 
of tltt• n·fpn•t•, indicatPs that in addition to the afore-
lllt·nt imwd injuries I >r<'~eott suffered a rather severe 
.~roin injury detailed in the rnedical records. 
Sig-nificant then is thl· cmuplete lack of inquiry to 
tht- ( 'hairman of the :Medical Advisory Board as to whe-
tht>r or not the tht>ory offered this Court has any merit. 
ThP an~\n'r is simple, tlH·n· is no evidence in the record 
to ~u~tain it. 
X o good ean be accmnplished in rehashing the sig-
nifirance of the various injuries. This is the area of the 
t'\IH'rt. The PXpPrt opinion, uncontradicted, fully sup-
ported and docurnented by the rnedical records is, "a 90% 
loss of body function as a result of multiple injuries. 
The groin score should be revised." 
POINT II 
90% LOSS OF FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 35-1-66 
U.C.A. 1953, IS NOT 'TANTAMOUNT TO TOTAL DISABILITY. 
Again Prescott disagrees with plaintiff's basic pre-
mi::;P. Prescott was not rated by the Medical Board upon 
the basis of 90% loss of body function equivalent to the 
lo~~ of an arm at the shoulder or the loss of a leg at or 
near the hip joint. The finding this court must consider 
must be "a 90% loss of body function as a result of 
multiple injuries." 
Prescott contends that he is not limited to the pro-
Yisions of 35-1-66 l~.C.A. because this is the only place 
the words '"bodily function" appear. X or does Prescott 
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concede that the :Medical Advisory Board has the final 
determination of whether or not the defendant is perman-
ently and totally disabled. This is the province of the 
Industrial Commission. 
The position of Prescott in this case is best illus-
trated and supported by Silver J(ing Coalition Mining 
Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 69 P. 2d 608, (92 
U. 511) written by Justice \Volfe and concurred in by 
all members of the Court. In a very similar accident, 
involving crushing injuries to the chest, the applicant 
was found by the Medical Committee to have suffered 
total body disability of 50%. However, after hearings 
and examination by the Board, the Commission awarded 
an additional 40 weeks which would interpolate to a loss 
of 70% of 200 weeks. "There was no direct evidence of 
a 70% loss by anyone," says Justice Wolfe. 
As was typical of Justice Wolfe, the opinion reviews 
the various authorities cited by both plaintiff and de-
fendant herein. What is most important in the case at 
hand is Justice Wolfe's analysis in the opinion when the 
loss of bodily function approaches a total loss. vV e quote 
his discussion of the problem in its entirety c01nmencing 
at page 613: 
"(11, 12) It should be noted that there is a 
seeming difficulty in the application of the last 
part of section 42-1-62, (now 35-1-66) above quot-
ed, when the loss of bodily function approaches 
a total loss. Section 42-1-63 (now 35-1-67) pro-
vides that certain loss of bodilv n1e1nbers or parts 
or the total loss of use of th~m shall in law be 
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<'OII~idt-rt>d a~ total penuanent di~ahilit~·. For such 
lo~~ thP sufi'Pn'r obtains compensation for 260 
wPt-k~ at 60 }>PI' eent. of hi~ \ntges, thereafter 
until dt>ath at -l3 p<'r cent. of his wages with a 
maximum of $16 and a Ininin1u1n of $7 a week 
providP<l. Tlw next zone takes into consideration 
<·a~<·~ whieh are not in law total permanent, but 
which tlw emmnission finds so as a matter of fact. 
The question 1nay be well asked, and it is collater-
ally material in this case, what articulation the 
Compt>nsation Art makes betwe<•n those cases 
where thP loss of bodily function is not total but 
~u('h a great percentage of the full functions as 
to pnwtically make the applicant industrially or 
P<·mwmically totally and permanently disabled. 
Under the part of Section 42-1-63, above re-
ferred to, the compensation is still based, as in 
thl' case of a loss of an arm or leg, on loss of 
bodily function regardless of earning power. As 
stated in the dissenting opinion of the Caillet 
Ca8e, a 1nan might suffer great loss of bodily 
function under this section and be paid for that 
loss, although it were shown that he was earning 
ten times as 1nuch as before as a radio announcer, 
and YicP versa, a brilliant pianist who lost a finger 
would get only compensation for the loss of his 
finger, although his livelihood was gone. The 
compensation for permanent partial disability is 
measured either by the sehedule or in proportion 
thereto and as deen1ed equitable on the loss of 
bodily function alone, and the n1aximum is 200 
weeks. But if the applicant clai1ns total and per-
manent disability the issue is as to whether he is 
totally and permanently disabled industrially and 
economically. There is a hvilight zone where one 
blends into the other. That i~. the loss of bodilY 
function may be so great as to leave one totall}~ 
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and permanently disabled industrially. Thus a 
person with 90 per cent loss of bodily function 
might be able to prove himself totally a11d JH>rnwu-
ently disabled. If soJ he u:ould take himself out 
of the class of applicants limited to recover u ucler 
the paragraph of section -±2-1-62, alJove quoted) 
and put himself in the class where his compensa-
tion should be determined by his total lack of in-
dustrial or economical ability. But until that point 
is reached, the permanent partial disability is 
seemingly compensated for on loss of bodily func-
tion alone with a maximum of 200 weeks. The fact 
that a workman may stop in the zone of perman-
ent partial, not quite going over into the zone of 
permanent total, and therefore obtain a maximum 
of only 200 weeks, whereas, a trifle more dis-
ability would bring him into what the commission 
might find as a fact to be an industrial or economic 
permanent total giving him 260 weeks plus 45 per 
cent. for the remainder of his life, leads us to 
wonder whether this 200 weeks' maximum is sup-
posed to be the equivalent to a total loss of bodily 
function as the commission seemed to conceive 
it in this case. The applicant had a loss of bodily 
function of 70 per cent. The commission, there-
fore, gave him 140 weeks' compensation on tlw 
theory evidently that if he had 100 per cent. loss 
of bodily function he ·would have been totally 
permanently disabled industrially and economic-
ally and therefore be entitled to compensation for 
the rest of his life." 
It is submitted that J ustire \Y olfe's analysis is a 
complete ans·wer to plaintiff's proposition discussed un-
der Point II. 
Consider further Justice \Volfe's dissent in Caillet 
vs Tndnstrial Commission) 58 P. 2d 760 at page 763 (90 
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r. <") WhPI'Pin }w eonsiden; wJwt COnstitutPS total dis-
ability: 
"\\'hen we get to section .f-2-1-63 dealing with 
total permanent disability, we are once 1nore back 
in the field of actual loss of ability without con-
dusivP presu1nptions of law as in section .f-2-1-62, 
exeept in the case of the loss or complete loss of 
both hands, or both anns, or both feet, or both 
legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof. In all other 
<·ases there Inust be a proof of per1nanent total 
disasbility. What is 'total disability J' It does not 
mean total loss of bodily function. If so, a man 
would have to be hopelessly paralyzed. It does 
not n1ean such disability which would prevent 
any person from doing any work. If that were so, 
it would Inean loss of mind, for some persons 
have energy and will to re-train themselves to earn 
so long as their minds are good. It means dis-
ablement of the particular applicant to earn wages 
in the type of work (not just the particular work 
he did do) he was trained for or any other type 
work wfflch a person of his mentality and attain-
ments could do. It cannot depend on whether or 
not the economic situation prevents him from 
getting a job. The test is his capacity, not whether 
the economic situation permits that capacity to be 
applied in industry." 
'r e submit that Prescott meets the stricter test laid 
down by Justice Wolfe in his dissent. We cannot help 
but mention also in passing that Justice Wolfe, in his 
dissent, concluded that, 
uif the Commission in this case had come to 
the conclusion that the applicant was totally dis-
abled under the evidence, the award would have 
had to be upheld, because the Connnission was the 
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one to judge of applicant's ability to earn in am· 
field of human activity, and if it had li<'id that thi·~ 
particular man with his particular Inakeup and 
impairment was totally unable to earn substantial-
ly his living, we would have upheld it because 
still within the zone of reasonable conclusions. 
But it is equally qualified to conclude under its 
knowledge and experience that this man is not 
totally disabled and, in my opinion, that decision 
should be upheld." 
Prescott also satisfies the requirements of this court 
enunciated by Justice Wolfe in his n1ain opinion in 
Babick vs Industrial Commission, 65 P. 2d 1133. (91 U. 
581) 
Admittedly Prescott, with 90% loss of body function 
as a result of multiple injuries, is in the zone between 
35-1-67 and 35-1-66. There is no showing that Prescott 
has "a fair field of economic activity open to the applicant 
of the sort which can return him to a fair living. The 
Commission did not act arbitrarily. \Ve cannot disturb 
the findings," to quote the Courts conclusion in the 
Babick case. 
The best Prescott might expect if he lived in the 
Salt Lake area, which he does not, would be some type 
of non-competitive employment such as Deseret Indutries 
where people are given work on a charitable basis and 
did not have to compete with others to get the job. 
(R-81, 82). 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED, AS THE 
TEST OF TOTAL DlSABILITY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
CAILLET CASE, AND THAT DOCTRINE HAS BEEN SUB-
STANTIALLY MODIFIED. 
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.\gTPP WP respectfully disagree with plaintiff's coun-
:-;t•l. Tt i~ t ruP that tlw Caillet case is Inentioned in the 
finding~, but as we view the evidence and the record 
Pl'P~eott sati~t'iP~ all of the requirements heretofore laid 
down hY this court in all cases mentioned by plaintiff. 
The sole issue to be determined herein is whether or 
not there is con1petent evidence to support the findings 
ot' tlw Commission. There is no conflict in the evi-
dence. The cumulative weight of the medical opinion, 
the determination of the Division of Vocational Rehabil-
itation and the testimony adduced at the hearing lead log-
ically to a finding by the Commission of permanent total 
disability. Had the finding been any other we submit that 
under the principle enunciated in Thomas v. Industrial 
Commission, 72 P. 2d 1, (95 U. 32), the Commission 
would be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE A FINDING OF COM-
MISSION IS UNDER ATTACK, THE ISSUE ON WHICH 
REVIEW IS .SOUGHT IS PURELY AN ISSUE OF LAW. 
This proposition is novel to say the least. We are 
unable to agree, "that the Commission found and every-
one agrees that the disability from injury is essentially 
the same as the loss of a leg at the hip." The Commission 
found, and we agree, that the applicant is permanently 
and totally disabled. 
The function of this court is to determine from all 
of the evidence if the Commission's finding can be sup-
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ported. We submit that there is no evidence the other 
way. To a 90o/o loss of body function from Inultiple in-
juries add Prescott's mentality, training, education, age 
or in essence his capacity, the conclusion of the Commis-
sion is inescapable - permanent and total disability, 
fully supported by the evidence. 
Respectfully sumitted 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
By ANDREW R. HURLEY 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Attorney for defendant 
John W. Prescott 
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